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INTRODUCTION
It is an honor and a pleasure for me to have been asked to
deliver the Sixteenth Henry J. Miller Distinguished Lecture,
joining an impressive list of practitioners, legal academics, and
jurists who have preceded me. I want to thank the College of
Law and, in particular, my friend, Professor Stephen Wermiel,
for making this visit possible. I also want to express my
appreciation to you for your willingness to reschedule the Miller
Lecture from September, when surgery for a ruptured Achilles
tendon made it impossible for me to travel. I am certain you can
understand how good it feels for me to be able to stand before
you without a cast, crutches, or any other mechanical aids. I am
also happy to be back in Atlanta where I was born and still have
family, as well as a number of friends from my Carter
Administration days who were able to resist "Potomac Fever."
t Solicitor General of the United States. Prior to assuming his post as Solicitor
General, Mr. Days was Professor of Law at Yale University School of Law. Mr. Days
is a 1963 honors graduate in English Literature of Hamilton College in Clinton, New
York. He received his LL.B. degree from Yale University in 1966. This essay is a
revised version of remarks delivered as the Sixteenth Henry J. Miller Distinguished
Lecture at Georgia State University College of Law on March 13, 1995.
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I.
I am particularly appreciative of this invitation because it
provides me with an opportunity to talk about a dimension of the
Solicitor General's responsibilities that is very rarely discussed
and even less understood. To the extent that there is public
awareness of the fact that a Solicitor General exists-thanks to
books like Lincoln Caplan's The Tenth Justice1-that knowledge
tends to be limited to his duties before the Supreme Court where
he represents the United States in a wide variety of cases each
Term. Indeed, the Solicitor General and his staff are true "repeat
players" before the Court, arguing about two-thirds of all the
cases heard each Term. Nothing captures the public imagination
more, I suspect, than the thought of the Solicitor General
standing up to argue before the Supreme Court in striped pants
and morning coat, as tradition dictates.
The Solicitor General has another major responsibility,
however, beyond that of filing briefs and arguing cases in the
Supreme Court. He is also charged with, to quote the relevant
regulation, "[dJetermining whether, and to what extent, appeals
will be taken by the Government to all appellate courts ...,n2
and "[dJetermining whether a brief amicus curiae will be filed by
the Government, or whether the Government will intervene, in
any appellate COurt.,,3 This means, in other words, that when the
Government loses a case in the federal district courts, no appeal
of that "adverse decision" may be pursued without the Solicitor
General's authorization.
It also means that there can be no appearance by the
Government in any appellate court by way of intervention or as a
"friend of the court" without the Solicitor General's approval. But
since the Solicitor General rarely appears in courts below the
Supreme Court (and does not wear his striped pants and
morning coat when he does), there is little reason for the public
to know that he is even involved. The briefs on appeal filed by
the Government do not usually contain the Solicitor General's
name and are for the most part written and argued by lawyers
1. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE (1987).
2. 28 C.F.R. § O.20(b) (1994).
3. [d. § O.20(c).
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from one of the Justice Department's six litigating divisions4 or
United States Attorneys' offices.
In this and certain other respects, I doubt that I am alone
among Solicitors General in feeling some ambivalence about our
hazy public image. Sometimes, one secretly welcomes headlines
that say, "President does X," or "Attorney General does Y," when
the Solicitor General knows responsibility for an unpopular
decision should rightly be placed at his door. At other times, one
feels insulted for not receiving credit for a job well done. Only a
few months into my tenure, for example, I found myself
confronted with a district court opinion that seemed to leave the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) high and dry.5
The stock market in Mexico City was plunging, and the
Administration needed a quick decision on whether I would
authorize an appeal.
Shifting myself, my staff, and an entire division of the Justice
Department into high gear, I was able to have several analyses of
the opinion done, to have recommendations completed by the
affected litigating division and my staff, and promptly thereafter
to reach a decision in favor of appeal. I was rather proud of
myself as I communicated my decision by telephone, only four
hours after the trial court's opinion was released, to an anxious
Ambassador Mickey Kantor as he headed into a packed news
conference to announce the appeal decision.6 The Ambassador
acknowledged my role in the process. But later that evening,
having turned to other matters on my desk, I decided to hear
what National Public Radio had to say about the appeal. The
lead was as follows: Today, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen
announced that an appeal will be taken in the NAFTA case!
4. Those divisions are: Antitrust, Civil, Civil Rights, Criminal, Environment and
Natural Resources, and Tax.
5. See Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 822 F.
Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rel/d, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685
(1994).
6. See Peter Behr, NAFTA Pact Jeopardized by Court; District Judge Orders
Environmental Study, WASH. POST, July 1, 1993, at AI; Peter G. Gosselin,
Environmental Ruling Blocks Free Trade Pact, BOSTON GLOBE, July 1, 1993, at 1;
Steven Greenhouse, Judge Gives Order That May Delay Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 1993, at D3.
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II.
I had a rough sense of this part of the Solicitor General's job
prior to my assuming the post, based upon my experience as
head of the Civil Rights Division in the Carter Administration.
My perspective then, however, was that of a subordinate official
petitioning the Solicitor General to approve appeals in cases that
my division had lost at trial. But nothing adequately prepared
me for what I found was the immense volume of appellate
matters that require the Solicitor General's review and decision. I
asked a lawyer on my staff, as I prepared these remarks, to
determine exactly what this workload had been since I took
office. What she found was that between May 28, 1993 (the day I
was sworn in) and March 2, 1995, I had acted on 1756
recommendations related to the Government's appearance in
appellate courts or roughly three each day, including weekends
and holidays, for the twenty months that I had been on the job.
The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, noted the
importance of the Solicitor General's role in serving as a "gate
keeper" or "traffic cop" with respect to government litigation at
that leveF At the appellate court level, the Solicitor General
serves a similar, but not identical, function. His approval is
necessary only when the Government has lost in the trial court;
if the Government has been successful, the appeal is taken by the
other side and the Solicitor General plays no direct role in that
process. In the Supreme Court, in contrast, the Solicitor General
exercises control over what the Government does, irrespective of
whether it has won or lost in the lower courts. Consequently, in
the appellate courts, the Solicitor General is, properly speaking,
only "half of a traffic cop."
In that capacity, the Solicitor General's job is to weed out those
adverse decisions worthy of further review from those that are
not. Where decisions unfavorable to the Government lack
precedential significance (for example, because they are
unpublished or involve unique factual characteristics), or turn on
factual determinations by trial judges that are unlikely to be
reversed on appeal, or have deficient records, the Solicitor
General will normally deny authorization to appeal. Solicitors
General may come away from reviewing such recommendations
7. See Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S. Ct. 537,
542 (1994); United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706 (1988).
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with the gut sense that error was committed in some of these
cases. But, given the thousands of criminal prosecutions and civil
suits brought by the Government, as well as the number of
claims fIled against federal agencies and officials, the absence of
a screening process for Government appeals would put further
stress on the already overly-burdened appellate court dockets. It
would also result in the waste of precious human and financial
resources on a number of ultimately lost causes.
The Solicitor General serves as a "screen" at another stage of
the appellate process as well. In cases where the Government
loses an appeal before a panel of three federal appellate judges, it
may seek review of that decision by the entire court of appeals
bench. Georgia, for example, is in the Eleventh Circuit with an
authorized strength of twelve judges. No such petition for what
we call en banc review before all twelve judges, should the case
arise in the Eleventh Circuit, may be fIled by the Government
without the Solicitor General's authorization. According to the
federal rules, petitions for en banc review should be fIled only in
cases "(1) when consideration by the full court is necessary to
secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the
proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.,,8
There is an understandable tendency of government lawyers who
have lost on appeal to view that adverse ruling as necessarily
generating questions of "exceptional importance." It is the
Solicitor General's job, however, to resist that notion and to take
seriously the concern of federal appellate courts that en banc
review not be sought routinely. To give you a sense of the
difference between the operation of the initial appeal screen and
the en banc screen, I have authorized appeals in just under
eighty percent of the cases presented to me during my tenure; in
contrast, I have approved only fifty percent of recommendations
seeking en banc review.
Of course, Solicitors General sometimes authorize appeals
because lower court opinions appear flatly wrong: criminals are
set free who deserve to go to jail; private parties in suits against
the Government receive monetary awards that simply cannot be
justified under prevailing precedents. But I believe that the most
important function the Solicitor General performs is that of
orchestrating the movement of government litigation up through
8. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
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the lower courts toward ultimate Supreme Court review. In view
of the nationwide scope of federal government programs and
enforcement activities, the most important goal of government
litigation, next to having the courts uphold the legality of
challenged programs, is that of obtaining uniform legal rules, win
or lose.
For example, the Supreme Court accepted for review this
Term, at the Government's request, a case that raises the
question of what rules should govern the granting of credit
toward the reduction of sentences being served by federal
prisoners.9 At the present time, decisions by different federal
appellate courts have resulted in conflicting rules that turn upon
where a federal prisoner happens to be incarcerated at the time
his claim reaches court. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, however,
cannot operate under different legal regimes, since it runs a
national prison system and routinely transfers inmates between
correctional facilities located in different judicial circuits to
maintain security and population balance. As things now stand,
theoretically, inmates in California, Pennsylvania, or New York
sentenced to the same number of years in federal prison, on the
same day, may end up being released at different times because
of the conflicting court rulings.
The Solicitor General's job is to try to spot such problems early
on in the adverse decision process and to try to guide issues over
which the lower courts have differed to the Supreme Court for
definitive resolution. In so doing, he seeks to identify those
decisions that present the Government's position in the best
factual and legal context, that is, where the Government's
arguments have been clearly and forcefully presented in the
lower court and the facts are sympathetic to the Government's
position. In th.e latter regard, to the extent that the Government
comes off as over-reaching or heavy-handed in the lower courts,
its chances of achieving success on appeal are accordingly
diminished.
Where the Government's position has not been successful on
appeal in one or several of the twelve regional federal circuit
courts of appeals,10 the Solicitor General may authorize appeals
9. Koray v. Sizer, 21 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted sub nom. Reno v.
Koray, 115 S. Ct. 787 (1995).
10. The thirteenth, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, has exclusive
jurisdiction over certain classes of suits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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in the remaining circuits in an effort to obtain a successful
ruling. Such a result creates what is called a "circuit split," one of
the characteristics that increases the chances of persuading the
Supreme Court to accept a case for review down the line. Of
course, there may come a point when the response from the
appellate courts is so uniformly negative that the Solicitor
General may be forced to acknowledge that the Government's
position is unlikely to prevail if litigated further and to
recommend to the affected government department or agency
that a legislative remedy be sought where the question is one of
statutory interpretation. In any event, the Solicitor General's
decision to press positions in several appellate courts across the
country offers the Government an opportunity to adjust and
sharpen its legal theories with an eye toward prevailing in the
Supreme Court.
I have spoken mostly, up to this point, about the Solicitor
General's role with respect to federal appellate litigation. But I
do not want to leave you with the impression that only the
federal system is involved. In fact, the federal Government also
appears from time to time in state courts in an amicus capacity.
Where litigation in those courts implicates federal statutes,11
affects the United States tax system,12 or involves the rights of
Indian tribes to water or fishing grounds,13 for example, the
federal Government seeks to participate to ensure that its
interests are not adversely affected.
III.
Having offered the foregoing outlines of the Solicitor General's
role in the state and lower federal courts, I would like to describe
in somewhat greater detail how the process actually works. The
Hence, direct conflicts with the other circuits do not occur.
11. See, e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386 (Ct. App. 1994)
(holding unconstitutional a local ordinance that authorized crinlinal sanctions for
persons "camping" on any public area). The statute in Tobe implicates federal interest
in problems of homelessness, as embodied in the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless
Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987).
12. See Crowder v. Benchmark Bank, 889 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(presenting question whether, under state law, creditor may foreclose against certain
property when it has become subrogated to a federal tax lien).
13. See Atlantic Salmon Fed'n v. Maine Bd. of Envt'l Protection, No. KEN-94-779
(Me. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 10, 1993) (raising question of scope of Indian tribes' fishing
rights under state statute enacted to implement a federal statute and ratified by
Congress).
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first example involves a case that was accepted for review in the
Supreme Court this Term, has already been argued, and is now
awaiting decision, City ofEdmonds v. Washington State Building
Code Council. 14
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) makes it unlawful "[t]o
discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of
a handicap of ... that buyer or renter.,,15 The Act requires that
"reasonable accommodations" in rules and policies be made to
enable persons with disabilities to enjoy equal housing
opportunities.16 Congress did create an exemption, however, for
"reasonable ... restrictions regarding the maximum number of
occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling."17
Beginning with the Bush Administration, the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division has been actively involved in
a series of cases that tests the meaning of the maximum
occupancy exemption. Many cities around the country have
zoning ordinances that restrict the number of unrelated, but not
the number of related, persons who may live together in single-
family residential zones; these ordinances have been relied upon
in some communities to bar ten- to twelve-person group homes
consisting of persons recovering from drug or alcohol addiction.
The Government's position-which draws on the language,
purpose, and legislative history of the Act-is that these
ordinances really are "family-composition" restrictions, not
"maximum occupancy" restrictions, and therefore are not exempt
from scrutiny under the federal law. The Government's concern
has been that construing the Act to exempt completely single-
family zoning would undermine Congress's intent to provide the
disabled with meaningful opportunities to live in desirable and
wholesome residential environments.18
14. 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(lXA) (1988).
16. [d. § 3604(f)(3XB).
17. [d. § 3607(bX1).
18. In 1988, Congress enacted Section 2036 of Title II of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988 (ADM) to encourage the development of Oxford Houses and similar group
homes. Pub. L. No. 100·690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4202 (currently codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 30Ox-25 (Supp. V 1994». That legislation requires states receiving certain federal
block grants to make loans available to help establish Oxford Houses and other group
homes for former substance abusers. 42 U.S.C. § 300x-25 (Supp. V 1994). The ADM
reflects the view that "after detoxification and inpatient rehabilitation many [people]
need to live in an alcohol- and drug-free environment for some time in order to avoid
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Various would-be group homes and their members have sued
municipalities challenging the "unrelated-persons" limits. The
United States has participated in these lawsuits in two ways: In
some cases, my immediate predecessor and I have authorized
amicus participation; in others, the United States has itself
brought an enforcement action U'nder the Fair Housing Act
against the municipality, which suit is then typically consolidated
with the private suit. In 1992, in a case in which the Government
participated as amicus, the Eleventh Circuit became the fIrst
court of appeals to rule on the issue. It held, in a suit against the
City of Athens, Georgia, that unrelated-persons rules do fall
within the Fair Housing Act exemption as reasonable occupancy
restrictions.19
Two years later, in March 1994, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
Government's view in the Edmonds case,20 from Washington
State, thus creating a conflict with the Eleventh Circuit. The
Government was a party in Edmonds. In this case, the other
side, rather than the Government, sought and obtained Supreme
Court review. But it was our expectation that once a circuit split
occurred, the Supreme Court would fmd it an attractive issue to
consider. In recent months, I have continued to approve amicus
participation in suits presenting the question raised in
Edmonds21 and have authorized an appeal to the Eighth Circuit
of an adverse decision on the question in a case involving St.
Joseph, MissOuri.22 Decisions in these cases likely will not be
rendered by the lower courts, however, until the Supreme Court
resolves Edmonds.
The second example provides an insight into the process by
which an important constitutional issue is working its way up to
the Supreme Court and the role that the Government is playing
to try to shape and focus litigation over that issue by intervening,
relapse," and that Oxford Houses "provide the kind of support necessary for [those]
individuals." 134 CONGo REC. 33,140-41 (1988) (remarks of Rep. Madigan); see also
H.R. REP. No. 592, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990) ("The Oxford House concept
represents a 'missing link' in the treatment process ....").
19. Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 376
(1992).
20. City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, No. 94-10648 (5th Cir. filed
July 11, 1994).
22. See United States v. City of St. Joseph, Nos. 91-6122-CV-SJ-8, 91-6022-CV-SJ-8
CW.D. Mo. filed Nov. 21, 1991).
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with the Solicitor General's authorization, in the lower courts.
Whenever a suit is brought in federal court in which the
constitutionality of any act of Congress "is drawn in question"
and to which the United States is not a party, the court has a
duty to advise the Attorney General of that fact.23 The United
States then has a statutory right to intervene in the case with all
the rights of a party in order to present evidence or argument on
the constitutionality question.
The United States has recently availed itself of that procedure
in a number of cases involving the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA),24 enacted in November 1993. In RFRA, as it is
called, Congress sought to overrule a 1990 Supreme Court
decision which held that laws of general applicability that burden
the free exercise of religion need not be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny.25 RFRA thus provides that ~ state or federal
government may "substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person" furthers a compelling government interest and is the
least restrictive means of doing SO.26
RFRA has been challenged primarily on the grounds that
Congress lacked Article I authority to promulgate the Act, and
that the Act infringes on the rights reserved to the states by the
Tenth Amendment. The Government's position is essentially that
Congress's broad remedial powers under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment support the Act's constitutionality. Many
of the cases involve claims by state prisoners that certain
conditions of their confinement violate RFRA; the states then
defend on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional. For
example, a state prisoner in Hawaii contends that prison officials
scheduled his law library time to conflict with a religious
program,27 and an inmate in Virginia complains that the prison
will not serve kosher meals.28 In another context, a church has
alleged that a zoning regulation which prohibits it from
expanding its facilities violates RFRA.29
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (1988).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (Supp. V 1994).
25. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (Supp. v 1994).
27. Coronel v. Hawaii, Civ. No. 93-00165 (D. Haw. filed Feb. 26, 1993).
28. Cochran v. Morris, No. 94-6104 (4th Cir. filed Dec. 30, 1993).
29. Flores v. City of Boerne, No. 95·67 (5th Cir. flIed May 23, 1994).
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To date, I have authorized intervention in eighteen actions in
which RFRA's constitutionality has been challenged-in one
federal circuit COurt,30 fifteen district COurts,31 and two state
COurtS.32 One significant benefit of intervention, as opposed to
amicus participation, is that intervention accords the United
States status as a party and thus enables the Government to
appeal an adverse decision. Indeed, the Government has
intervened in one case in which the magistrate judge
recommended a finding of constitutionality,33 partly in order to
preserve the ability to appeal should the district court rule to the
contrary. As these cases wend their way up through the lower
courts, it is our aim to develop the strongest defense of the Act's
constitutionality and build a body of decisions to that effect,
fairly certain in the knowledge that the issue will be before the
Supreme Court soon.
IV.
One might think of the adverse decision process in terms of a
pyramid that starts with a large base of federal litigation in the
trial courts. Higher up the pyramid one finds a narrower set of
Government appeals; the pinnacle, of course, is the Supreme
Court. At that point, the Solicitor General confronts a relatively
small group of cases about which a decision must be made
whether to seek Supreme Court review. Solicitors General
traditionally make clear that the decision to authorize an appeal
or en bane review in a case represents no commitment that a
petition for certiorari will be filed at the end of the appellate
30. Cochran, No. 94-6104 (4th Cir. filed Dec. 30, 1993).
31. Coronel, Civ. No. 93-00165 (D. Haw. filed Feb. 26, 1993); Muhammad v.
Coughlin, No. 91-Civ.-6333 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 19, 1991); Jolly v. Coughlin, No. 92
Civ. 9026 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11, 1993); Francis v. Keane, No. 93 Civ. 0045 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Jan. 5, 1993); Bass v. Grattoli, No. 94 Civ. 3220 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 3, 1994);
Alameen v. Coughlin, No. 94-CV-0965 (E.D.N.Y. flled Mar. 4, 1994); Yates v. White,
No. 94-1322 (W.D. Pa. flled Aug. 8, 1994); Linton v. White, No. 94-1604 (W.D. Pa.
filed Sept. 19, 1994); Hughes v. Lehman, No. 3:94-0731 (M.D. Pa. filed June 18,
1994); Flores v. City of Boerne, No. 95-67 (5th Cir. filed May 23, 1994); Gedo v. Salt
Lake County, No. 94-C-233J (D. Utah flled Mar. 3, 1994); Snyder v. Murray City
Corp., No. 94-C-667(G) (D. Utah filed Oct. 6, 1994); Gates v. Smith, No. 93-0090-R
(W.D. Va. filed Feb. 2, 1993); Sasnett v. Dep't of Corrections, No. 94-C-52-C (W.D.
Wis. filed Aug. 1, 1994); Hair v. Cooke, No.94-C-0332 (E.D. Wis. flled Mar. 30, 1994).
32. Rogers v. Fiedler, No. 94-CV-1054 (Wis. Cir. Ct. flled Mar. 26, 1994); Doxtator
v. Thomas, No. 94-CV-2096 (Wis. Cir. Ct. flled Sept. 20, 1994).
33. Coronel, Civ. No. 93-00165 (D. Haw. flled Feb. 26, 1993).
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process, since the screening process at that point must,
necessarily, take on greater rigor. As the Supreme Court stated
recently with respect to the Solicitor General's screening
function, "[t]he Government as a whole is apt to fare better if
these decisions are concentrated in a single official.»34 The
Solicitor General, as you might expect, is unlikely to be a very
popular person at this stage of the process, since the great
majority of recommendations for Supreme Court review in
Government cases are not approved.
CONCLUSION
Most of you probably recall the debates a few years ago that
swirled around whether C-SPAN should be allowed to use
stationary or mobile cameras in covering congressional floor
debates. Some members of the House and Senate feared that
mobile cameras might give the viewing public a misimpression of
how federal legislators spend their time, since Representatives
and Senators on occasion speak from the well to only a handful of
their colleagues. Voters might not understand that those not
present were busy with committee hearings or providing
constituent services elsewhere on Capitol Hill, they complained.
The solution was to allow only fIxed cameras that would focus on
the speaker rather than upon his or her audience.35
In much the same spirit, I thought that this speech would
serve to reassure you and others who may read or hear about it
that the fact that the Solicitor General is not dressed in striped
pants and morning coat arguing before the Supreme Court does
not mean that he is shirking his responsibilities. He is just back
in his office poring over a mound of the day's adverse decisions,
amicus or intervention recommendations stacked high on his
desk!
Thank you.
34. Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S. Ct. 537, 542
(1994).
35. See Linda Greenhouse, TV: The Senate Grins and Brauely Tries to Bear It, N.Y.
TIMES, May 2, 1986, at A20; House Rejects Rule on Cameras in Chamber, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 1984, at D22.
